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Traditional Economics View of
Investor Protection Regulation (IPR)
• IPT at best replicates, and possibly impedes,
market arrangements
• Firms have incentives to disclose 
information and act in investors’ best 
interests
• Verification problems overcome by private  
enforcement of contracts
Alternative ‘Law and Finance’ View
“Financial markets do not work well when left to
market forces alone”
[LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, JF 2005]
• IPR reduces threat of minority shareholder 
expropriation and so encourages market 
participation
• Financial development and economic growth
facilitated by IPR
IPR Dispersion within Countries
• But many countries have multiple capital 
‘markets’
‘One-size-fits-all’ IPR?
• IPR Debate has taken place at the country 
level
• Focuses on relationship between 
international differences in IPR and major 
stock market development
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• Should centralised trading have IPR 
choice?
• International differences: US/NZ vs UK
Advantages of IPR Choice
• More profitable firms
• Enhances investor welfare
• Encourages competition
Firms
Firms can trade off the costs of high-level IPR
against the benefits of a lower cost of capital
Table 1
Costs of capital and IPR
______________________________________________________
Trading Platform
Centralised with Centralised with Decentralised
high-level IPR low-level IPR (ie, traditional OTC)
(ie, major exchange) (ie, new OTC)
______________________________________________________
IPR costs
Risk premium Risk premium
Liquidity premium
______________________________________________________
Investors
• Investors can access low-IPR opportunities 
without being forced to accept an illiquid 
position
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Investors
• Investors can access low-IPR opportunities 
without being forced to accept an illiquid 
position
• IPR choice allows some investors to be better
off while making none worse off
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Competition
• Different platforms compete for 
listings, keeping costs on major
exchanges down
IPR and Financial Market Development:
the Evidence
Table 2
____________________________________________________________
Outcome Mean effect of increasing IPR
Variable from the 10th to the 90th percentile
____________________________________________________________
Market Cap/GDP 15 to 39 percentage points
Firms per capita 28% to 74%
Ownership Concentration -2 to -13 percentage points
Turnover/GDP 24 to 65 percentage points
Cost of equity -100 to -340 basis points
Integrated countries 0 to -100 basis points
cost of equity
Interpretation and Implications I:
Endogeneity
• Causality may be reversed
• US and UK experiences
Interpretation and Implications II:
Economic Significance
• Open capital markets allow firms
to separate own-IPR from country-
IPR
• IPR link to cost of capital lower in
countries with open capital 
markets (Table 2)
Interpretation and Implications III:
Relevance for Intra-Country IPR
• Tells us only that IPR assists the
development of major stock 
exchanges
• Even if the provision of regulated
investments and trading is 
beneficial, it need not follow that
offering only regulated 
opportunities is optimal
Spillovers
• Less regulated platform may
impose negative externality costs
on more regulated platform
Spillover Effects I: Confusion
• Simultaneous existence of high- and low-IPR
platforms creates confusion and discourages
participation in any platform
• But international portfolio investment seems
to be independent of IPR
Moving from 10th to 90th IPR percentile 
lowers US investor holdings of available 
offshore shares by between four and nine 
percentage points
• Adjusting for size differences actually 
makes things worse:
International Portfolio Investment
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Spillover Effects II: Contagion
• Investors in high-IPR market react 
negatively to an adverse events on low-
IPR market
• Collapse of individual firm doesn’t have
significant effect on own market
• Actual cross-market disturbances 
precipitated by macro shocks
• Investors are rational enough to price
IPR, but not to ignore irrelevant events
Appropriate Test for Uniform IPR
• Costs of imposing uniform IPR are at 
least partially irreversible
• Doing so therefore requires
B  >  λC
where B is the value of the expected 
stream of benefits, C represents the 
associated costs, and λ > 1 is the 
'uncertainty multiple'.
Summary
• Strong IPR almost certainly good for financial
and economic development:
"...leaving financial markets alone is not a 
good way to encourage them.”
[LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
NBER, 1999]
• But this doesn’t rule out further welfare gains
from intra-country variation in IPR
• Costs of uniform IPR are transparent, but 
proposed abstract benefits of uniform IPR 
lack empirical support
